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Abstract
In this paper, we study the information contents of imbalances in trades and quotes emanated
from an exchange resembling the one envisioned by Black (1971). We find dollar volume is more
informative than number in measuring daily trading and quoting activities. Our measure of
quote imbalance permits an investigation on the information asymmetry between market and
limit orders. In case illegal insider trading does not occur regularly, we present a hypothesis
of reverse liquidity as an alternative interpretation for our empirical findings. It could be that
market-order traders charge an implicit liquidity premium for fulfilling the contrarian trading
demand of limit-order traders. We suspect proprietary traders are filling the vacuum created by
the absence of designated market makers and they provide reverse liquidity through their active
trading.
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1. Introduction
Although trading activity is generally considered to be informative, its measurement is still
contentious in the literature. For example, Jones et al. (1994) show that the positive relation
of volume with price moves is due to the number of trades and not the transaction size. They
conclude that size has no information content beyond that already impounded in the number
of transactions. On the contrary, Chan and Fong (2000) and Chordia et al. (2002) find that
trade size is more significant in explaining the volume-volatility relation, particularly when it is
used to measure the aggregate order imbalance between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. In
addition, Chordia et al. (2001) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)’s papers highlight the
importance of order imbalance as a measure of trading activity. Their results demonstrate that
order imbalance is more valuable than volume in inferring the direction of price moves for the
next trading day. The implication of this finding in the context of designing trading strategies
that yield anomalous returns is obvious.
Strictly speaking, order imbalance makes sense only when there is a middleman to make
the market by holding an inventory to accommodate temporary imbalance between buy and sell
orders. For a fully automated exchange that has no designated market maker, there is no order
imbalance in the sense of inventory management. However, since the founding concept of order
imbalance is trade direction, one could still entertain order imbalance for trades executed by a
computer. A market order that hits a limit order1 at the ask price could be considered as buyer-
initiated, and seller-initiated trades are those executed at bid prices. The imbalance in trades
initiated by market orders is then computed analogously as the difference between those that
hit the ask and those that hit the bid.
1Limit orders are permitted in most if not all major stock exchanges. Four of the largest stock exchanges in the
world, namely, the NYSE, Nasdaq and their associated ECN’s, Tokyo Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange
all allow traders to place limit orders. The study of limit orders is gaining momentum recently. For example, Bias
et al. (1995)’s empirical analysis of Paris Bourse reveals a pattern of more limit orders when spreads are wide and
more market orders when spreads are narrow. Empirical tests by Handa and Schwartz (1996) suggest that placing
a network of buy and sell limit orders around the current price is profitable in 1988. Using the TORQ database,
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) find limit orders placed at or better than the prevailing quote are superior than market
orders on the NYSE. Ahn et al. (2001) find that transitory volatility and market depth are dynamically related for the
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They infer that limit-order traders enter the market and place orders when liquidity
is needed. Lo et al. (2002) develop an econometric model based on survival analysis and report that execution times
are sensitive to limit price but not order size. Theoretical models of limit and market orders include Glosten (1994),
Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Seppi (1997), Foucault (1999), Dupont (2000) and Suominen (2001).
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Much research has been devoted to unveiling the relation between stock price changes and
trading activity on the NYSE and Nasdaq where there are specialists and broker-dealers respec-
tively to make the market. On an electronic exchange where the matching of orders is fully
automated, it is not obvious whether volume traded contains more information than the number
of transactions in driving stock prices. Furthermore, in the absence of designated market mak-
ers, it is also important to measure the information content of order imbalance that affects daily
returns.
In addition to order imbalance, we quantify the imbalance in the supply and demand of limit
orders by defining the depth difference as the prevailing bid size less the ask size in dollars
immediately before a trade. The quote direction is positive for bid and negative for ask because
bid limit orders seek to buy while ask limit orders attempt to sell. For presentation clarity, we
employ the term “trade imbalance” to refer to the usual notion of order imbalance, and “quote
imbalance” to the depth difference and other quantities determined primarily by quotes. These
two terms are meant to highlight the duality of market and limit orders in initiating trades and
quotes, respectively. An understanding of trade and quote imbalances will have implications on
order placement strategies when stock exchanges are fully automated.
We purchased a unique tick-by-tick data set from the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading
to examine the information contents of trade and quote imbalances2 on a fully automated ex-
change. Our empirical research makes three contributions to the literature. First, we find that
dollar volume is more informative than the number of trades in measuring the trade imbalance.
Second, we demonstrate that the quote imbalance in dollars is also reflected in daily returns.
This quantity provides additional insights on the information dichotomy between market- and
limit-order traders. Interestingly, its relation with returns is found to be negative, suggesting
either the existence of asymmetric information, or a situation of reverse liquidity where market
orders provide liquidity to limit orders. We suspect proprietary traders are playing the role of
market makers through their active participation in the market that results in reverse liquidity.
Finally, we document for the first time a negative autocorrelation for the day-to-day changes in
2We focus on the information content of imbalances rather than volume because the latter is fairly well studied as
seen from the empirical literature such as Gallant et al. (1992), Campbell et al. (1993), Conrad et al. (1994), Lo and
Wang (2000), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Chakravarty (2001) and Llorente et al. (2002), just to name a few after
Karpoff (1987)’s survey.
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quote imbalance, which may be attributed to the stalking of equilibrium price by the midpoint of
prevailing quotes when the underlying depth difference between the bid and ask reflects a latent
imbalance in supply and demand.
Many empirical papers have investigated trades and quotes originated from exchanges with-
out designated market makers. The growing literature includes Lehmann and Modest (1994)
who examine data time stamped to the nearest minute from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
for all stocks on the First Section over 26 months. Bias et al. (1995)’s Paris Bourse sample is
40 stocks over 19 trading days. Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) study three TSE stocks over 59
trading days. In Brown et al. (1997), 20 most actively traded stocks on the Australian Stock
Exchange over a period of two years are the objects of study. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)
focus on 16 largest Finnish stocks over 502 trading days. Ahn et al. (2001)’s paper is based on
12-month data of 33 liquid stocks provided by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Linnainmaa
(2003)’s analysis uses 30 largest stocks traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange over 622 trading
days. Kalay et al. (2003) obtain data from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange with 105 stocks over 167
trading days to estimate the supply and demand elasticity.
Our research differs from these earlier papers in a number of ways. Firstly, while most au-
thors tend to focus on stocks with high trading and quoting activities, we cover also less liquid
stocks, as a more comprehensive sample demonstrates the robustness of research findings better.
In fact, our sample size of 447 stocks is second to Lehmann and Modest (1994), and our sample
period of 290 days is reasonably lengthy for studying the daily information contents of trades
and quotes. Secondly, our focus on daily return as a dependent variable allows the potential
gains or losses from using limit orders to be inferred directly. As a comparison, Ahn et al. (2001)
investigate the intra-day relation between the depth and volatility. But evidence that suggests
some gains or losses from using limit orders over market orders is not examined. Moreover, their
depth is computed differently as the number of outstanding limit orders at the end of 15-minute
interval, whereas our daily quote imbalance in dollars is the aggregate of irregularly sampled
bid or ask sizes whenever a transaction occurs. Our data are time stamped to the nearest second
while theirs are half a minute. Thirdly, most authors tend to rely on insider information story
or adverse selection problem confronting risk-averse market makers to motivate their empirical
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works, and to count on limit orders to provide liquidity. We complement information asymmetry
hypothesis by exploring the possibility of proprietary traders as day traders, who provide liquid-
ity in a reverse fashion when they use mainly market orders to move the price, and to open and
close their positions quickly with a profit.
This paper presents a case for asymmetric information and the hypothesis of reverse liquidity
as follows. In Section 2, we provide a description of the trading environment. Section 3 describes
our unique data set in detail. We document the empirical analysis and offer some possible ex-
planations in Section 4. A few potential shortcomings are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
summarizes our main findings.
2. Trading Environment of the Singapore Exchange
To develop an intuitive grasp on the information dynamics reflected in both market and limit
orders, it is crucial to understand the underlying market architecture and trading rules. Our
data are from the Singapore Exchange (SGX), which is a merged entity of the former Stock
Exchange of Singapore and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Unlike
U.S. and other larger countries where order flows are inevitably fragmented across multiple ex-
changes, the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading (SGX-ST) is the only stock exchange in
Singapore. As at end of March, 2003, the order-driven SGX-ST is ranked 24th among the 48
members of the World Federation of Exchanges in terms of market capitalization denominated
in U.S. dollars, which is twice larger than the American Stock Exchange (http://www.world-
exchanges.org/publications/EQU1103.XLS).
In a nutshell, the SGX-ST operates an exchange system much like an Electronic Communi-
cation Network (ECN). The main features of the trading environment are the types of orders al-
lowed, minimum tick sizes, insider trading laws and enforcement, as well as proprietary traders.
2.1. Order-Driven Market
Trading of all shares, warrants, debentures, exchange-traded funds, real-estate investment trusts
and other securities can only be carried out via SGX’s Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) system.
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The screen-based CLOB computer system maintains an order book and matches buy and sell
orders automatically. There are neither exchange-appointed market makers nor floor traders to
work the orders. Under this centralized system, quote and trade records are synchronized in
such a way that allows the trade sign to be observed directly. The best bid and ask prices with
the accompanied posted depths in the book are broadcast to the public free of charge. However,
the entire depth in the securities book is observable real-time if traders subscribe to streaming
data services.
To place an order, every trader must have an account with a SGX-ST member company3,
which is a brokerage firm. An order routed to the CLOB takes one of the following four forms:
• Market order
• Limit order
• Amendment order
• Withdrawal order
A trade occurs only when a market order enters the CLOB system and matches the limit order in
price. A market order can consume a few limit orders if the required volume is large. Conversely,
a large limit order becomes partially fulfilled when the volume of a matching market order is
less than its size. Unmatched limit orders at the end of the day are purged from the CLOB. An
amendment order reduces the volume but not the price, while the withdrawal order is equivalent
to an amendment that reduces the order volume to zero. The best bid price is determined by limit
orders with the highest price, and the best ask price by limit orders with the lowest price. For
limit orders with the same best bid or ask prices, the computer system determines the execution
priority by the time of order entry.
For order-driven markets, the trade direction is determined by the market order. On the SGX-
ST, the transaction price can only be the prevailing bid and ask prices, since there is no specialist
3There were 23 member companies during our sample period from the beginning of October 2002 to the end of
November 2003. Brokers who deal as pure agents for their firms’ clients are called dealers in Singapore. They are
the employees of brokerage houses. Those who also trade on their own accounts are called remisiers. They are
self-employed. Both groups of personnel are the trading representatives of member companies.
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or dealer to work the order. The price grid is determined by the minimum tick sizes described
below. More importantly, the trades and quotes are time stamped, reported and recorded on
the same platform. These aspects of SGX-ST’s market design enables the trade direction to be
observed unambiguously.
2.2. Minimum Tick Sizes
Under Bye-Law 2 of the SGX, five minimum tick sizes that depend on the price level are stipu-
lated. The step-wise increment of minimum tick size with the price level constrains the possible
range of quoted spread in percent. For example, the minimum tick size is S$0.005 for stock price
between S$0.005 to S$0.995. A trader who buys a penny stock at the bid price of S$0.005 and
sells it at the ask price of S$0.01 will gain as much as 100%. At the other end of this price range,
a trader who buys shares at S$1 and sells them at S$0.995 will lose 0.5% on the bid-ask spread.
The five minimum tick sizes are displayed in Table 1 along with the five corresponding ranges of
bid-ask spread in percent. Obviously, penny stocks have higher relative spreads.
2.3. Insider Trading Legislation, Disclosure and Enforcement
Regulations on insider trading and information disclosure are stringent in Singapore. Argu-
ments for the economic importance of insider trading laws and disclosure of price-sensitive in-
formation have been presented by Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) and Spiegel and Subrah-
manyam (2000).
In October 2001, the Securities and Futures Act (2001) was legislated to make it conducive
for prosecutors to nail down persons or institutions involved in insider trading. Any persons
who trade securities, futures and options contracts on stocks and stock indices while possessing
price-sensitive information, whether they are connected to the company involved or not, will be
prosecuted if their activities are exposed. The onus of proof is on the defendants to deny that
there was insider trading. The prosecutors need not prove that the defendants are connected to
the company involved.
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Conduct outside Singapore in relation to activities that concern securities and futures con-
tracts listed or traded on the SGX-ST is also covered under the Act. Furthermore, the Act
enhances the timeliness of information disclosure to the public. Beginning from the pre-IPO,
continuous disclosure of material information by listed companies is mandatory under the Act.
Substantial shareholders, which include company directors and entities with direct plus deemed
interests exceeding 5%, are also legally obligated to notify the SGX directly of their transactions
within two days. Moreover, false or reckless take-over announcements are criminal offences. The
penalties for such criminal offences are a fine not exceeding a quarter million Singapore dollars4
or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or both
(
Attorney-General’s Chambers
(2001)
)
.
To support their enforcement activities, SGX has put in place market surveillance systems
to detect irregular trading such as unusual price and volume movements. SGX may require the
listed company to announce whether it knew why there might be abnormal trading or inform the
public of any material information that might reasonably be expected to affect the trading vol-
ume and price significantly. SGX may initiate an investigation of alleged misconduct by member
companies, their directors, employees and trading representatives upon receiving a complaint,
or of its own accord. Disciplinary actions taken against broker-dealers for violating the regula-
tions in SGX’s Rules and Bye-Laws (2001) are published and archived on the official web site of
SGX, www.sgx.com.
2.4. Proprietary Traders
Another noteworthy aspect of the trading environment in Singapore is that almost every bro-
kerage house has a number of proprietary traders who occupy trading desks with specialized
terminals that grant them access to the entire limit order book, as well as direct entry of their
orders to the SGX-ST. They do not need to pay commission for their trades but are expected to
trade actively in the market as principals, either on their own accounts or brokerage firms’ ac-
counts. In addition, their brokerage firms may grant them credit, which can amount to millions
of Singapore dollars.
4One U.S. dollar was about 1.7 to 1.8 Singapore dollars during our sample period.
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For the credit and trading facilities provided, as much as 40 to 50 percent of the gains real-
ized by these house traders will go to their brokerage firms. Any realized losses, however, are
borne by the traders themselves. These proprietary traders usually close their positions within
a day, although the settlement of trades operates at the T+3 cycle. Through contra accounting,
only realized gains or losses are effected without the actual transfers of principal sums. Obvi-
ously, any proprietary traders who make sizable losses will have to discontinue their business.
Therefore, they have every reason to prowl the market and make a kill for their survival on
each trading day. With superior information access and more agile order submission strategies,
they earn their living by moving prices up and down through a combination of market and limit
orders. From the bid-ask spread, they obtain their rewards for providing liquidity to passive
mutual fund managers and retail investors.
Notwithstanding the fact that proprietary traders have access to financial news services and
may be better informed than retail investors, they are not company insiders and usually they
do not trade on insider information. In light of tough insider trading laws and enforcement, the
risk is too high for doing so. Instead, they behave more like speculative “noise” traders. Some
industry sources5 believe as much as 50 to 70 percent of total daily volume is churned out by
proprietary traders, especially after the brokerage industry was liberalized in 2000.
In short, these proprietary traders may be considered as some sort of “market makers,”
though they have no obligation whatsoever to maintain an orderly market. Every proprietary
trader is looking after her own interest but this selfish behavior contributes to the general wel-
fare of the stock market as far as liquidity is concerned. Nevertheless, the issues of fairness and
possible price manipulation remain. To deter manipulative trading activities, the SGX revised
the trading rules and spelled out the misconduct more explicitly in Chapter 13 of the SGX Se-
curities Trading Rules (2003). The relevant section on market manipulation and false market
is re-produced in the Appendix. It is quite telling how some market players are trying to ma-
nipulate the market through multiple-party collaboration, signalling by limit orders, successive
one-sided market orders and other tactics.
5Business Times, November 27, 2003 Editorial: Reducing conflicts of interest.
9
3. Data
The data used in this paper were purchased from the SGX-ST through a third-party data vendor.
Our data are daily merged files of signed trades and best quotes with a resolution of one second.
The entire depth of the securities book, however, is not available. Neither does each record
contain information regarding the identity of trader.
But our tick-by-tick data fulfill two important requirements. Firstly, to unambiguously ex-
amine the information content of trade imbalance, it is crucial to have transaction records with
trading direction provided. Secondly, to study the relation of quote imbalances with returns, it
is indispensable to have quote updates whose time stamps are based on the same clock used
for trade reporting. Thanks to the CLOB system, trade and quote records satisfying these two
specifications are available from the SGX-ST6.
The sample period is from October 4, 2002 to November 28, 2003, a total of 13 months with
290 trading days. This sample period is not by choice; it is determined solely by data availability.
During this period, the stock market experienced rough patches of sluggish economy with rising
unemployment. A general trend of the market is a downward drift from October 2002 to March
2003, and an upward movement from mid March to November 2003.
Having described the sample period, we turn to the choice of sample stocks. To be included
in the sample, the firm must not be a new listing, as typically the trading activity of an IPO is
abnormally high in the first few weeks. We checked the listing date of each firm to ensure that
none is within two months before the beginning of our sample period. In other words, all firms
6In contrast, the widely used TAQ database from the NYSE has the problem of unsynchronized timing and re-
porting of trades and quotes. This problem leads to ambiguities in the identification of prevailing quotes. To solve
this problem, Lee and Ready (1991) suggest a five-second rule for synchronizing trades with quotes. Obviously this
rule is heuristic at best. Odders-White (2000) find that the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm misclassifies or
simply cannot classify transactions at the quotes’ midpoint and transactions in large or actively traded stocks most
frequently. In addition, small transactions at the quotes and large transactions inside the spread are also prone to
error, which is systematically biased against seller-initiated trades. In addition, Peterson and Sirri (2003) report that
on average, estimates of execution costs overstate trading costs by up to 17% when the benchmark quotes are incor-
rect. Thus, it seems that the synchronization problem is quite severe. Empirical research on imbalance cannot be
done rigorously without observing the trade direction. There is always this nagging concern about the direction bias
in the errors and the proportion of trades that cannot be signed and thus discarded from the sample. It is not impos-
sible that the contradicting conclusions drawn by earlier empirical papers with regards to the number of transaction
versus trade size are consequent upon the limitations of the signing algorithm and data used.
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in the sample are at least two months well into their respective first days of trading. We also
exclude securities that are delisted and those that have only 30 transactions or less during the
entire sample period.
Other than these filters, we do not exclude penny stocks and stocks with negative book values.
These stocks are illiquid; they do not have trades on each trading day. Altogether, there are 447
stocks in our sample. These stocks constitute well over 95% of the entire market capitalization
in Singapore. Considering the fact that there are 508 locally listed companies as at the end of
first quarter of 2003, our sample is representative of both liquid and illiquid stocks traded on
the SGX-ST. The descriptive statistics for our sample are documented in Table 2. Data on the
market capitalization and prices are taken from the official web site of SGX, which are dated
as at March 31, 2003. Median market capitalization is 47.4 million Singapore dollars while the
median price per share is S$0.19. The numbers of shares outstanding, equity and book values,
are provided by the data vendor. As evident from the table, the ranges of these statistics are
rather wide, which bear witness to the highly representative nature of our sample.
To obtain some descriptive statistics for the trading and quoting activities, we first compute
the relevant numbers for each sample stock over the sample period. The cross-sectional average,
standard deviation, minimum, median and maximum values are then computed and displayed
in Table 2. The cross-sectional average number of trades at the bid price is 17.5 per day, while
the number of trades at the ask price is 18.9 per day. On the daily basis, the average number
of bid updates is 40.6 against 38.3 for ask updates. The liquidity level before a trade takes
place can also be computed from the data. On average, the daily aggregate volume is 39 million
shares at the bid and 38 million shares at the ask. In dollars, it is 20.75 million against 20.31
million. Overall, we see a large variation in these statistics, which testify again our sample is an
assortment of both liquid and illiquid stocks.
As mentioned above, the number and dollar volume of signed trades are computed on a daily
basis for each sample stock i. With these quantities, we define the following measures for trading
activity on each trading day t:
• TINi ,t : Number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades
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• TIDi ,t : Buyer-initiated dollars paid less the seller-initiated dollars received
These two quantities are the same as order imbalances measured in numbers and in dollars
respectively. Dollar volume is more convenient than volume because it is invariant whenever
there is a stock split.
Since depth is generated by limit orders, it is also of interest to investigate quoting activity
and direction. For this purpose, we consider the buying and selling interests signalled by limit
orders and define
• QINi ,t : Number of bid updates less the number of ask updates
• QIDi ,t : Aggregate depth difference measured in dollars, i.e., the daily net value of bid limit
orders less ask limit orders prior to transactions
The quote update imbalance QINi ,t is computed regardless of whether there are transactions. It
provides a daily summary of quotes’ dynamics in numbers. The aggregate depth difference, how-
ever, is computed only if there are transactions. The quote imbalance measure QIDi ,t indicates
the daily net amount of imbalance in buy and sell limit orders just before market orders arrive.
Put differently, the imbalance signals to market watchers the net beliefs of limit-order traders
over a day. When QIDi ,t is positive (negative), it means that in dollars, more limit-order traders
think that the bid (ask) price is a good price to buy (sell), which coincides with the latent demand
being higher (lower) than supply.
4. Empirical Analysis
This section reports our empirical findings on the efficacy of number versus dollar volume in
measuring trading and quoting activities. Since we are into order placement strategies, we com-
pare limit orders with market orders from the standpoint of daily returns. Though speculative,
notions of information asymmetry and reverse liquidity provision are offered for interpreting the
results. We also attempt an analysis on the relation between quote imbalance and the disparity
between the midpoint of quotes and the conditional expected value of equilibrium price.
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4.1. Daily Returns, Trade and Quote Imbalances
To marginalize microstructure effects, we use the closing midquotes to compute the daily return
ri ,t of sample stock i on day t as follows:
ri ,t =
Difference in Closing Midquotes of Stock i on Day t and Day t− 1
Stock i’s Closing Midquote on Day t− 1 . (1)
The closing midquote is half the sum of non-zero bid and ask prices last updated before the
trading session ends with at least a transaction. More precisely, if there is no transaction or one
of the quote prices is zero, ri ,t is not computable and the time series will have a gap or a missing
observation on day t. Any dividend payout is added to the difference when t coincides with the
ex dividend day.
To control for the market-wide effects, we consider the daily return rm,t of the Straits Times
Index (STI), which is the benchmark index of the Singapore stock market. It comprises 45 stocks,
which are selected based on their market capitalization and dollar volume. All component stocks
are weighted by free float, that is, the percentage of a company’s shares not in the hands of
controlling or strategic shareholders.
In addition, we also control for a measure of market breadth Bt defined as
Bt =
Number of Stocks with Positive ri ,t − Number of Stocks with Negative ri ,t
Number of Stocks with Positive ri ,t + Number of Stocks with Negative ri ,t
. (2)
Although the correlation between these two market-wide factors is 0.802, the motivation for
using Bt is to echo the “market sentiment” not captured in the STI. The introduction of these
two market-wide factors is to alleviate the correlation between a pair of stocks, and to control for
news that has an impact on the whole market.
Not all the 447 sample stocks had trading every day during the sample period. To perform
a balanced seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), we take a subsample of 63 stocks that had
transactions on all the 290 days. Information regarding these stocks is in Table 3. It is notewor-
thy that most of the stocks are less than three Singapore dollars per share. The motivation for
running SUR is to deal with the fact that the innovation ui ,t in the cross-sectional regression is
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such that for any pair of sample stocks i and j, the covariance E
[
ui ,t uj ,t
]
may still be non-zero
despite the two market-wide controls.
With the market-adjusted return7 being Ri ,t ≡ ri ,t−rm,t, each of the 63 subsample stocks has
289 observations from 290 trading days. We point out that using the quotes’ midpoint does not
necessarily remove the serial correlation in daily returns completely. While the market returns
rm,t and majority of the market-adjusted returns Ri ,t have insignificant AR(1) components, price
discreteness and asynchronous quotes may still induce some degree of autocorrelation in some
of the stocks. Thus, we first obtain the time series of residuals εi ,t from the following regression,
Ri ,t = ai + ρiRi ,t−1 + εi ,t (3)
for each of the 63 stocks before running SUR with ai and ρi being the parameters. We are after
the residuals εi ,t only and the two parameters are not used subsequently.
A key object of our study is to ascertain the explanatory power of trade and quote imbalances,
as well as to gain an insight on using number versus dollar volume in measuring the activity.
Hence, the market-and-AR(1)-adjusted return εi ,t is regressed on the market breadth Bt and an
explanatory variable EXV as follows:
εi ,t = b0 + b1Bt + b2 sln
(
EXVi ,t
)
+ ui ,t , (4)
where EXV is either TIN, TID, QIN or QID. In this specification, b0, b1 and b2 are the parameters
to be estimated and their statistical significance inferred. Since these variables are of different
orders of magnitude and can also be negative, we have applied a signed version8 of natural
logarithm defined as
sln(x) =

sign(x) ln
(|x|) if |x| > 0 ,
0 otherwise .
(5)
7Similar analysis is performed without adjusting for the market returns. We find in the subsequent regressions
that the statistical inferences for the estimates remain intact.
8Engle and Lange (2001) propose an unsigned version of trade imbalance in log levels. It is different from our
signed sln
(
TINi ,t
)
or sln
(
TIDi ,t
)
.
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Market microstructure theory
(
O’Hara (1995)
)
requires TIN or TID to convey information
asymmetry. The notion of intra-day price momentum also suggests that b2 should be positive for
these two explanatory variables. Intuitively, when market orders keep hitting the ask prices,
the stock price will rise, which implies that when both TIN and TID are positive, daily return is
inevitably positive.
We also run OLS regressions with the 63 time series of market-adjusted returns treated as
panel data. We use τ to index the pooled series. The regression is run in the following sequence.
First, the pooled series is rid of its AR(1) component by the following regression9:
Rτ = a+ ρRτ−1 + ετ , (6)
The residual ετ with 18,206 observations is the dependent variable in the following specification:
ετ = b0 + b1Bτ + b2 sln
(
EXVτ
)
+ uτ . (7)
Table 4 contains the regression statistics for SUR and OLS regressions without correction, as
well as Newey-West (1987) corrections with different lags. For the SUR, the coefficient estimates
shown in the table are the means of the 63 samples, while the t-statistics are computed as
√
63×mean/standard deviation, in analogy to Fama and MacBeth (1973)’s method.
After controlling for the market factors rm,t and Bt, regression results show that trade im-
balance measured in numbers, TIN, is not significant. When measured in dollars, however, the
trade imbalance TID is so significantly positive that the market breadth Bt as a control becomes
weakly significant. The adjusted value of R2 is 10.6%, which suggests that TID accounts for
about 10% of the variation in returns. This set of results demonstrates that the imbalance in
trading activity should be measured in dollars rather than in numbers, at least for this subsam-
ple of 63 stocks with continuous trading throughout our 13-month sample period.
Remarkably, all the coefficients estimated with SUR and with OLS are rather close. For
example, the estimate for TID’s coefficient is 0.00052 under SUR while the value is 0.00057
9Regression results are similar when we first remove the AR(1) component from the time series of daily returns
for each stock before pooling them together.
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under OLS. Not only is this coefficient statistically significant, it is also economically significant.
The mean of the absolute value of sln
(
TID
)
is 12.4, which suggests that it accounts for 67 basis
points of daily returns on average. With the cross-sectional mean of the absolute daily returns
being 151 basis points, it implies that about 44% of the information content of price moves is in
the TID alone for this subsample.
Turning to the quote imbalance, we find that the loadings on QIN and QID are both negative
and statistically significant. Intriguingly, the estimated value of −0.00053 from SUR is quite
the same as that from OLS for the imbalance in quote updates (QIN). The quote imbalance
measured in dollars (QID) has compatible coefficients from SUR and OLS. Its absolute value
of between 0.00012 to 0.00015 suggests that sln
(
QID
)
, whose mean absolute value is 14.8 for
our subsample, accounts for about 20 basis points of daily returns on average. This is not an
insignificant contribution. In other words, everything else being equal, if the dollar value of
limit orders bidding to buy is higher than that offering to sell, daily adjusted returns tend to
decline by 20 basis points on average for this subsample.
This outcome may appear counter-intuitive from the standpoint of supply and demand. A
positive QID implies the aggregate dollar value of limit orders at the ask prior to transactions is
smaller than that at the bid, which corresponds to a situation in which less shares are on sales
than sought for. Since supply is less than demand, one would expect the stock price to rise and
the daily return to be positive. However, the significantly negative coefficient of QID suggests
the very opposite. Despite the smaller amount of limit orders at the ask, the daily return will
tend to be negative rather than positive.
This negative relation between returns and quote imbalances measured in dollars provides
a direct evidence that limit-order traders are contrarian. Put differently, their opinions are not
shared by traders who use market orders to transact. Aggregated over a day, our data suggest
that if the dollar value of limit orders at the ask is smaller than that at the bid, then the market
orders will tend to hit the bid more than the ask. It follows that the stock price is more likely
to decline. We shall endeavor to explain these results in Section 4.3 after we are convinced that
this outcome is robust.
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4.2. Robustness Tests with Entire Sample
To ensure that the results reported above are not peculiar to just this subsample of 63 stocks, we
perform additional tests using the whole sample. First, we sort all the sample stocks based on
market capitalization. Five subsamples are formed. The first quintile comprises 91 stocks with
the smallest market capitalizations. The other four quintiles has 89 stocks each.
Also intended as a robustness check, we consider the following specification for each of the
five subsamples:
ετ = b0 + b1Bτ
+ b2 sln
(
TINτ
)
+ b3 sln
(
TIDτ
)
+ b4 sln
(
QINτ
)
+ b5 sln
(
QIDτ
)
+ uτ . (8)
Regressing the residual ετ (market-and-AR(1)-adjusted daily return) on all the contemporaneous
explanatory variables allows us to examine the contribution of each variable relative to others.
As before, the index τ is used for the pooled series. The results are documented in Table 5.
We report the OLS statistics with no correction for standard errors and another set with
Newey-West corrections. We run Newey-West procedures with different lags up to 5,000 lags. It
appears that after 1,500 lags, changes in the t-statistics are small and do not alter the inferences.
Intriguingly, based on the corrected t-statistics, only the coefficients of TID and QID are
statistically significant, and consistently of the same positive and negative signs respectively
across five quintiles. Notably for TIN, it is statistically significant for the fifth quintile of the
largest 89 firms only. But the sign of its coefficient is negative, which is incongruent with the
role of TIN as a measure of information asymmetry in the literature. Our results thus indicate
that as a measure of imbalance in trading activity, TID is more reliable than TIN. Similarly, QID
is more robust than QIN in measuring the imbalance in quoting activity.
We also observe that the magnitude of QID’s coefficient appears to decrease with the market
capitalization, especially from 0.00028 for the second quintile to 0.00010 for the fifth quintile.
The coefficient of TID decreases with market capitalization as well. This is anticipated because
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larger firms tend to attract more trades and thus sln
(
TID
)
is typically larger. Consequently, the
coefficients are smaller so that the returns are not overtly larger than those in other subsamples.
We also sort the stocks according to their book-to-market ratios. Eight stocks in our sample
have negative book values. They are excluded from this test10, but not in other tests. As a result,
every quintile now has 87 stocks. The regression statistics are shown in Table 6. For this test, we
witness again that both TID and QID are statistically significant. While TIN is not significant
at the 5% level, the QIN is significantly positive. Another observation is that the dispersion in
the estimated coefficients of QID is smaller than the corresponding ones in Table 5.
However, QID is no longer as significant when we arrange the observations according to
the five price levels stated in Table 1. As shown in Table 7, only in the first two categories —
smaller than S$1 and from S$1 to S$2.99 — do we obtain statistically significant QID. On the
contrary, we find TIN is significantly negative except for penny stocks, underscoring once again
the problem with measuring trade imbalance in numbers.
Finally, we pool all observations for the entire sample stocks together, perform the same ritual
of removing any AR(1) component from the pooled series. Though computationally intensive, we
run an OLS regression with Newey-West correction using 1,500 lags. The following is obtained:
ετ = 0.00049 + 0.00465Bτ
−0.00023 sln(TINτ)+ 0.00089 sln(TIDτ)
+0.00077 sln
(
QINτ
)− 0.00014 sln(QIDτ) . (9)
The adjusted R2 is 5.78% and the Durbin-Watson statistic for uτ , 2.0086. From the corrected
t-statistics of 3.1, 5.7, −1.5, 33.8, 6.9 and −10.7 for the coefficients b0 of the intercept to b5 of
QID, we infer that all are statistically significant except the coefficient of TIN.
It is easy to understand why TIN may be insignificant whereas TID is positively significant.
As an illustration, suppose there are ten buyer-initiated trades with the trade size being one lot
each, and the combined trade size of ten lots does not deplete the prevailing depth at the ask.
10Assuming that stocks with high book-to-market ratios are financially distressed firms, we include the eight stocks
with negative book values in the first quintile and check whether the statistics vary drastically. They do not.
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We further suppose that subsequently a seller-initiated trade of a hundred lots hits the bid and
depletes its depth. The midquote shifts lower as a result of this trade. In this instance, while
TIN is +9, TID is −90 lots times the original midquote. Clearly, the midquote is moved in the
direction of TID rather than TIN.
The results of cross-correlation analysis documented in Section 4.4 are consistent with this
intuitive explanation. This is because if every market order has about the same size, then TIN
and TID will be highly correlated. But our data apparently suggest otherwise; their correlation
is only 0.55. Overall, our results indicate that even if TIN is measured with no error, it is still
an unreliable gauge of information asymmetry. This does not imply, however, that TIN has no
information at all. Our analysis seeks to understand the impacts of trade and quote imbalances
on daily returns, not volatility. Since volatility is high if trading frequency is high, and fre-
quency is inversely related to the number of trades, it follows that the number of trades may be
informative from the perspective of price fluctuation. Therefore, we do not see our conclusion as
contradictory to Jones et al. (1994) whose focus is on volatility.
4.3. Negative Relation between QID and Returns: Information Asymmetry and
Reverse Liquidity
There are at least two explanations for the seemingly paradoxical outcome of a negative relation
between daily returns and quote imbalance in dollars, QID, which is the daily aggregate of depth
differences prior to transactions. We consider the case for which QID is negative. Arguments for
the opposite case of positive QID follow conversely.
First, in the presence of information asymmetry with market-order traders assumed to know
more than limit-order traders, this outcome is inevitable. After all, market orders are active
while limit orders are passive. If there are no market orders, no trade will occur even if there are
many limit orders at the best bid and ask prices. It is the market order that moves prices in its
trade direction. When market orders keep hitting the ask, daily return will be positive. Traders
who use market orders to buy either know that even at the ask price, the stock is still under-
valued as they expect the stock price to move higher than the current ask price. Other informed
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and momentum traders also join in the race to buy up the shares by using market orders to hit
the next ask price. Thus, although the aggregate value of the limit orders at the ask price is
larger than that at the bid price, informed traders will still use market orders to buy at the ask
price.
On the other hand, traders who sell with limit orders do not know that the stock is under-
valued. More crucially, if they do not have time to monitor the market closely and stand ready
to adjust their limit orders, the unexpected arrival of news will make them especially vulnerable
to the sudden change in stock valuation not in their favor. Either they get the winners’s curse,
or their limit orders will not be fulfilled.
Therefore, in conjunction with the fact that the coefficient of TID is positive, there is evidence
to suggest that market-order traders typically know more than limit-order traders. Our result is
consistent with the extant hypothesis that limit orders are used mostly by uninformed traders.
This hypothesis is upheld in Linnainmaa (2003)’s study that uses high-frequency data from the
Helsinki Stock Exchange.
If information asymmetry is the only cause, then it appears that limit-order traders are either
dumb or irrational. On daily average, they lose by 17 basis points for the entire sample. Why
then submit limit orders that may lose 17 basis points while market orders stand a chance of
gaining 91 basis points on daily average for the whole sample?
Thus, a second explanation that requires a change of mindset is called for. Most market
microstructure researchers deem limit orders as providing liquidity and market orders as taking
liquidity. It may well be the other way round. We consider the possibility of a reverse situation
where market orders provide liquidity to limit orders. We call it the reverse liquidity hypothesis.
To enunciate this reverse liquidity hypothesis as an alternative yet complementary explana-
tion, let us recall the main feature of a limit order. Traders who do not need trade execution
immediacy but are willing to bear the risk of not fulfilling their orders can use limit orders to
specify the prices at which they are ready to transact. The main benefit of limit orders is that
traders stand a chance to trade at a favorable price within the range of price fluctuation. For
example, discretionary liquidity traders may just want to liquidate their shares for cash at what
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they think is a better price. If they are not desperate to liquidate immediately, the ask price is
better than the bid price and so they place a limit order at the ask. Conversely, if they want to
accumulate the shares, they will submit a limit order at the bid.
It is important to note, however, that traders who use limit orders are pursuing contrarian
trading strategies. A sell limit order is executed only if the stock price advances to its ask
price and beyond. Conversely, a buy limit order is fulfilled only if the stock price moves down
to its bid price. If the price continues its downward momentum, limit-order traders will make
a loss and suffer the winners’ curse. Under the reverse liquidity hypothesis, the dual to this
contrarian behavior is the remuneration exacted by market-order traders for making the trades
happen. The potential loss of limit-order traders represents this implicit transaction cost. From
the complementary perspective of option, limit-order traders are underwriting a free call option
at the ask price and put option at the bid price for the market-order traders, so as to entice them
to trade and thereby provide reverse liquidity. When these options are exercised by market-order
traders, limit-order traders will lose 17 basis points immediately on average.
A possible scenario of reverse liquidity hypothesis involves proprietary traders in the broker-
age houses. They trade every day for their living by buying up the shares and then selling them
later in the day. Depending on the market conditions, they may short-sell first and buy back
later. Any block positions outstanding at the end of trading session can be neutralized through a
married deal upstairs whenever counter-parties are available. Such married deal is legal under
the current bye-laws of SGX-ST.
As seen from Table 7, the statistics for penny stocks in Panel A show significantly negative
QID. Since penny stocks have much larger relative spreads compared to other stocks, a bounce
between the bid and ask can be as high as 4.1% on average in our sample. Therefore, there is
incentive for discretionary liquidity traders to use limit orders if they can afford to wait for a
better price, which is the lower bid price if they buy and the higher ask price should they want
to sell. For proprietary traders, the larger relative spreads are attractive too as they need to
move the quotes by just a tick to earn about 4% on average for these stocks. Therefore, when
these house traders implicitly band together and use market orders to move the price, it is not
implausible that market orders may at times provide liquidity to limit orders.
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4.4. Autocorrelations and Cross-correlations
In Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), discretionary liquidity traders split their transactions
over days to reduce the price impact. They demonstrate that this behavior will result in trade
imbalance exhibiting autocorrelation.
In light of their theory, we compute the autocorrelations for TIN and TID up to 20 lags for
our sample. The pooled technique is again employed. For completeness, we also estimate the
autocorrelation functions for QIN and QID. Figure 1 displays the results. Intriguingly, these
four quantities all exhibit persistent behaviors at the 5% level. The trade imbalance in dollars,
nonetheless, is not as persistent as the other three. Moreover, the first-lag coefficient for TID is
smaller compared to others, which are in excess of 0.2.
In Figure 2, six cross-correlation functions are plotted. TIN is found to correlate positively
with the other three measures of imbalance: 0.55 with TID, 0.2 with QIN and 0.3 with QID. It is
easy to understand why the two measures of trade imbalance are correlated. Somewhat surpris-
ing though, is the not so weak relation of TIN with QIN, and with QID especially. In contrast,
TID is weakly related to QIN and QID, being of the order of -0.04 and 0.06 respectively. The
positive correlation between the two measures of quote imbalance, QIN and QID, is remarkably
low as well.
Also notable in Panel B is that TIN lags QIN by one day with a coefficient of 0.15. Put it
the other way round, one could reasonably forecast next day TIN with today’s QIN. Another
interesting feature in Panel D is that TID leads QIN by a day with a coefficient close to -0.08.
Thus, if the trade imbalance in dollars is positive today, the following day’s quote imbalance in
numbers is more likely to be negative. Since QIN can explain daily returns, at least for our
subsample of 63 stocks as seen in Table 4, one may be tempted to use these relations to generate
anomalous returns. However, these relations are rather strenuous as the R2 values are small.
Using the autocorrelations of trade and quote imbalances instead is perhaps more promising.
Whether the net gain, if any, is still not negligible after deducting the transaction costs remains
to be seen in future research.
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4.5. Are there Inventory-Managing Market Makers on SGX-ST?
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) also develop a model of risk-averse market makers who
dynamically accommodate autocorrelated trade imbalances created by discretionary liquidity
traders’ strategies of order splitting. Their model predicts that conditional on the contemporane-
ous and lagged trade imbalances, the coefficient of contemporaneous trade imbalance is positive
while it is negative for lagged trade imbalance when both are used to explain daily returns in
an exchange with designated market makers. Empirically, they find evidence that supports this
prediction for NYSE stocks. Since the SGX-ST has no designated market maker, one would not
expect to find this relation of lagged trade imbalance with returns to be significant after control-
ling for the contemporaneous trade imbalance. To test this null hypothesis, we run the following
regression:
εi ,t = c0 ,i + c1 ,i sln
(
TIDi ,t
)
+ c2 ,i sln
(
TIDi ,t−1
)
+c3 ,i sln
(
TIDi ,t−2
)
+ c4 ,i sln
(
TIDi ,t−3
)
+ c5 ,i sln
(
TIDi ,t−4
)
+ ei ,t . (10)
We pool the 447 time series and run the OLS regression with Newey-West correction using
1,500 lags. Panel A of Table 8 shows that contemporaneous TIDi ,t is significant and positive, a re-
sult that reinforces the inferences in earlier subsections. Intriguingly, however, we find the trade
imbalance at one lag is positively significant, which is contrary to Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004)’s conclusion. But our results do not necessarily imply that their theory is flawed. The
market designs of NYSE and SGX-ST being fundamentally different, one would not expect the
relation between the daily returns and lagged trade imbalance, after controlling for the contem-
poraneous trade imbalance, to be the same. Moreover, since a key component of their theory is
market maker managing the inventory, our results may well be an indirect affirmation. In other
words, if their model is correct, then there should not be a positive ci ,t and a negative ci ,t−1 in
an exchange with no designated marker maker. This is indeed the case in our findings. The
coefficients of TID at one lag are not negative for all the size-sorted subsamples.
We have alluded to the possibility of proprietary traders acting as market makers, especially
in the context of reverse liquidity hypothesis as revealed by the properties of quote imbalance.
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In the same breath, we have also indicated that most proprietary traders usually do not hold
inventory overnight. Even if they do, they will probably use the upstair mechanism to close their
positions through married deal. Hence, our proprietary traders do not make markets in the same
manner as in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004).
What is puzzling, nonetheless, is the positive significance of TID at one lag. In the absence
of a theoretical model, we can offer only the momentum effect of trade imbalance as a possible
explanation. Intuitively, one could view it as momentum traders attempting to catch up with the
first movers, who may be insiders, informed institutional traders, or proprietary traders. But as
discussed in Section 2.3, with the somewhat draconian insider trading laws being enforced, the
probability would likely be low for transactions in our sample that involved insiders or connected
persons exploiting their privileged information.
For completeness, we also consider an analogous specification with TID in equation (10) re-
placed by QID. The results are presented in Panel B. Consistent with our earlier documentation,
we see that the contemporaneous coefficients of QID are negatively significant across the five
quintiles except the first quintile of smallest firms. Since the smallest firms attract the least
trading activity, a weakly negative coefficient of contemporaneous QID does not necessarily nul-
lify the possibility of adverse selection or reverse liquidity hypothesis. It does indicate, however,
that QID is less robust than TID. Also notable in Panel B is that the coefficients of QID across
five quintiles at one lag are positively significant, which is rather surprising. Thus, with the
exception of the first quintile, it seems that there is a parallel to Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004) but in the reverse sense with QID’s contemporaneous coefficient being of opposite sign
from its coefficient at one-lag. It could be that the market over-react to the information content
of quote imbalance and thus the sign reverses a day later.
Regardless of what the plausible explanations may be, the positive coefficients of TID and
QID at one lag are interesting features of the trades and quotes recorded in the CLOB of the
SGX-ST. If these features are also present in other ECN-like exchanges, then a theoretical model
of automated exchanges with no designated market maker ought to consider and explain these
empirical regularities.
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4.6. Implications of Quote Imbalance
To better understand the information impact of quote imbalance, we postulate a relation be-
tween the quote imbalance qidt with the price difference between the conditional mean of the
equilibrium price mt and the midquote pt as follows:
qidt =
(
E
[
mt
∣∣Ψt−1]− pt)`+ νt . (11)
Here, ` is a parameter, Ψt−1 the information set and νt the innovation at time t. All the quantities
in equation (11) are in the logarithmic levels, e.g. qidt ≡ sln
(
QIDt
)
. For ease of description, the
index i of individual stock is omitted. When not all the limit orders are cleared, the conditional
expected value of the equilibrium price E
[
mt
∣∣Ψt−1] may not equal the midquote pt owing to the
quote imbalance qidt that reflects the transitory disparity in the demand for liquidity by limit-
order traders. In the unlikely event that qidt = 0 on day t when all limit orders are matched
with market orders or when the bid and ask depths are equal, then the midquote pt coincides
with the conditional mean of the equilibrium price, which is not observable.
If we further assume that the equilibrium price is a martingale, namely, E
[
mt
∣∣Ψt−1] = mt−1,
then
qidt = (mt−1 − pt)`+ νt . (12)
Accordingly,
∆qidt =
(
∆mt−1 −∆pt
)
`+∆νt (13)
with ∆ being the time differencing operator, e.g., ∆pt ≡ pt − pt−1. From the independence of ∆νt
with ∆pt , ∆pt−1 , ∆mt−1 , ∆mt−2 and ∆νt−1, we obtain
Cov
[
∆qidt , ∆qidt−1
]
= `2Cov
[
∆mt−1 −∆pt , ∆mt−2 −∆pt−1
]
. (14)
The assumption that mt is a martingale implies that Cov
[
∆mt−1 ,∆mt−2
]
= 0, which leads to
Cov
[
∆qidt , ∆qidt−1
]
= −`2Cov[∆mt−1 , ∆pt−1]
+`2Cov
[
∆pt , ∆pt−1
]− `2Cov[∆pt , ∆mt−2] . (15)
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Moreover, the non-contemporaneous covariance of ∆pt with ∆mt−2 is also expected to vanish.
These considerations imply that
Cov
[
∆qidt , ∆qidt−1
]
= −`2Cov[∆mt−1 , ∆pt−1]+ `2Cov[∆pt , ∆pt−1] . (16)
One would expect the midquote change ∆pt−1 to relate positively with the contemporaneous
∆mt−1 when the market is reasonably efficient. If the autocorrelation of the midquote change
is negative, equivalently, Cov
[
∆pt , ∆pt−1
]
is strictly negative, a necessary implication of quote
imbalance is
Cov
[
∆qidt , ∆qidt−1
]
< 0 . (17)
In any case, one would expect the contemporaneous covariance between ∆mt−1 and ∆pt−1 to be
larger than the lagged covariance between∆pt and∆pt−1 in magnitude. Even if Cov
[
∆pt , ∆pt−1
]
is not negative, it probably will not overturn the negativity of Cov
[
∆qidt , ∆qidt−1
]
.
To verify, we compute the autocorrelation of ∆qidt for every stock. More than 98% of our
sample stocks have negatively significant serial correlation at the 5% level. At the 10% level, all
are significant. The range of correlation coefficient is from −0.884 to −0.115, with the average
and median being −0.456 and −0.460, respectively.
5. Potential Caveats
Naturally, our results and arguments are subject to a number of criticisms. First, an implicit
assumption made in our paper is that the prevailing quotes and their depth imbalances are
much more informative than the second, third and deeper quote prices and depths in the order
book. One may argue that the entire securities book must be taken into account when computing
QIN and QID.
The limitation in our data set prevents us from looking into the effects of quotes and depths at
the deeper levels on daily returns. Nonetheless, it is more unbelievable that the prevailing quotes
and depths have less information than their counterparts at the deeper levels. Furthermore,
if we take it that the total depth at the bid may or may not be smaller than that at the ask
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whenever a trade is about to take place, then the coefficient of QID should not be significant.
Since the entire depth includes the prevailing depth, it would also imply that QID is probably
not significant when the depth difference is computed using only the prevailing depths for the
entire sample of 447 stocks. Moreover, if price pressure from the disparity in supply and demand
of limit orders is the only possibility, then the coefficient of QID should be positive rather than
negative.
Whatever the case may be, the negative relation of QID with returns found in this paper
need to be qualified with the warning that they are conditional on the validity of the implicit
assumption made.
The second shortcoming is that the exclusion of trades and quotes five minutes outside the
regular hours of SGX-STmay introduce biases. To make sure, we perform the same analysis with
such observations included. Our inferences at the conventional levels of statistical significance
still hold.
The third shortcoming concerns the estimation procedures used. But like Chordia and Sub-
rahmanyam (2004), we minimize the effects of cross-sectional covariance of innovations by ad-
justing the returns with market returns. In addition, we have also controlled for any remaining
AR(1) component, as well as the market breadth. To ensure that the t statistics are not over-
rejecting the nulls, we have experimented with various estimation methods including general-
ized least squares, the random effects model and so on. We find that OLS with Newey-West
correction is appropriate in not over-rejecting the nulls. Since OLS estimates are unbiased and
consistent, and given the large number of observations when data are pooled, it is not likely that
the economic significance of the estimated coefficients is compromised 11.
The fourth shortcoming is our lack of direct observations of order flows from proprietary
traders. Because the SGX is adamant in protecting the confidentiality of the trader identity
and in upholding transaction anonymity, we are not able to differentiate their trades and quotes
from others in our data set. Nonetheless, we had opportunities to speak with representatives
from three prominent brokerage houses, as well as with officials from the SGX-ST. A straw poll
11Further discussion of the practical merit of OLS with Newey-West correction vis-a`-vis a general variance-
covariance weighting matrix can be found in Section 15.4.2 of Mittelhammer et al. (2000).
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was conducted with regards to the overall trading volume of proprietary traders. The range of
between 50 to 70 percent of total daily volume traded for some of the stocks was the consensus.
With brokerage commissions being fully negotiable for all transactions on the SGX-ST after
the brokerage industry was liberalized, coupled with the trend that more retail investors are
bypassing broker-dealers by entering orders online themselves to reduce transaction fees, it is
not surprising that even the trading representatives of financial institutions — brokerage houses
especially — have no choice but to make a kill in the market. In Linnainmaa (2003), similar situ-
ation seems to prevail in the Helsinki Stock Exchange where institutional traders are “smarter”
and use market orders more often than retail investors. In this regard, our analysis of SGX-ST
is consistent with Linnainmaa (2003)’s documentation.
That said, we reiterate the caveat that we do not observe proprietary traders’ transactions.
Our arguments for their possible role in reverse liquidity provision are only worth considering
if a rendition for the positive relation of returns with TID and a negative relation with QID is
required. Similarly, like many other empirical papers that use insider trading as a motivation,
it is impossible to directly observe illegal transactions by insiders or connected persons from our
data. Neither are the order flows of informed traders observable.
6. Concluding Remarks
Inspired by Black (1971)’s arguments for reducing the functions performed by designated market
makers, this paper examines the information contents of trade and quote imbalances for shares
traded on a fully automated exchange. The main focus is on asymmetric information and liquid-
ity, as well as the possible emergence of proprietary traders in filling the vacuum created by the
absence of designated market makers.
In addition to trading activity, we introduce quoting activity as the daily aggregate difference
in the dollar values of limit orders at the bid and ask immediately before transactions. This
measure is particularly useful in unfolding the asymmetric information contents of limit orders
and market orders.
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Our study provides clear evidence that dollar volume is more informative than number in
measuring trade and quote imbalances. This result is obtained after controlling for market-wide
factors and microstructure effects. It is also independent of how our 447 sample stocks from the
Singapore Exchange Securities Trading are grouped. Whether by market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio, or price level, dollar volume is consistently informative in capturing price pressure
signals, asymmetric information with price momentum and reverse liquidity provision.
When market orders and limit orders agree on the direction of price moves, in the sense that
if dollar values of limit orders at the bid are larger than at the ask, stock prices tend to move
up by market orders. Conversely, daily stock prices tend to decline when the selling pressure is
higher. This phenomenon can be understood within the standard framework of net supply and
demand pressure on prices. A higher limit order value at the bid signals demand is higher than
supply, which nudges the stock price higher.
But our empirical findings are more consistent with market orders disagreeing with limit
orders. Despite demand being higher than supply as reflected by the posted depth difference
before a trade, the stock price moves downward instead. This phenomenon is counter-intuitive.
It can nonetheless be explained by two possible hypotheses. The first hypothesis is based on
asymmetric information. Traders who use market orders appear to know more about the daily
stock value than those who use limit orders. Informed traders will sell down the stock price
even if the size of limit orders at the bid price is larger. Inherently, limit orders are passive and
contrarian; traders who have no resource to monitor and cancel their orders readily must bear
the risk of winners’ curse.
Given that company insiders do not trade everyday, we consider the second possibility called
the reverse liquidity hypothesis. Traditionally, it is thought that limit orders provide liquidity
to market orders. It could well be the reverse. At times, it is the market order that provides
liquidity to the limit order. This situation can arise when proprietary traders move prices and
profit from their active trading activities. They may even implicitly co-operate to sell down
the price and then buy up later in the day. Such profiteering processes that provide liquidity
concurrently may benefit discretionary liquidity traders who seek to accumulate shares for long-
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term investment or to liquidate their holdings. On average, limit order traders pay a daily rate
of 17 basis points to market order traders for fulfilling their contrarian trading demand.
Since the trade and quote imbalances are found to be persistent, there may be implications of
our findings on forecasting daily returns that are worth exploring in future research. Nonethe-
less, this paper focuses on trade imbalance and introduces quote imbalance to unfold the innards
of information dynamics empirically. We also demonstrate for the first time that the change in
quote imbalance measured in dollars is negatively auto-correlated. On average, it is −0.46 for
our sample stocks. This negative autocorrelation may be attributed to the stalking of equilib-
rium price by the midpoint of prevailing quotes when the underlying depth difference between
the bid and ask reflects a latent imbalance in supply and demand.
In summary, from the standpoint of daily returns, it is concrete that volume measured in
dollars rather than in numbers is more informative in revealing the information contents of
trades and quotes. Trade imbalance is definitively a positive driver of stock returns. We have
also provided evidence that suggests a negative relation between quote imbalance and daily stock
returns. The information asymmetry between market and limit orders, as well as the reverse
liquidity hypothesis are presented to explain this negative relation.
Our study may be potentially useful for U.S. markets during pre-regular-hour sessions when
most trades and quotes are not mediated by market makers, as well as for ECN-like exchanges
around the world. We suspect in the vacuum of designated market makers, proprietary traders
or somemarket participants fill the gap by their active trading. While they contribute to liquidity
through their trading activities, the issues of fairness and alleged price manipulation remain.
The insights obtained herein may also shed light on whether certain functions performed by a
specialist or saitori should be automated.
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Appendix SGX Securities Trading Rules (2003)
13.8 MARKET MANIPULATION AND FALSE MARKET
13.8.1 A Trading Member or a Trading Representative must not
engage in, or knowingly act with any other person in, any
act or practice that will or is likely to:-
(1) create a false or misleading appearance of active
trading in any securities; or
(2) lead to a false market in respect of any
securities. For avoidance of doubt, a false market
includes a market in which:-
(a) information is false, exaggerated or
tendentious;
(b) contrived factors are in evidence, such as
buyers and sellers acting in
collaboration to bring about artificial market
prices; or
(c) manipulative or fictitious orders,
transactions or other devices have been employed.
Please refer to Practice Note 13.8.1.
13.8.2 The following factors are relevant when considering
whether an act or practice may breach Rule 13.8.1:-
(1) whether the proposed transaction will be
inconsistent with the history of, or recent trading in,
the security;
(2) whether the proposed transaction will or may cause
or contribute to a material change in the market for or
the price of the security, and whether the person
involved or another person with whom the first person
is collaborating may directly or indirectly benefit
from alterations in the market or price;
(3) whether the proposed transaction involves the
placing of multiple buy and sell orders at various
35
prices higher or lower than the market price, or the
placing of buy and sell orders which give the
appearance of increased volume;
(4) whether the proposed transaction will coincide with
or is likely to influence the calculation of reference
prices, settlement prices and valuations;
(5) whether parties involved in the proposed
transaction are connected;
(6) whether the buy and sell orders are to be entered
at about the same time, for about the same price and
quantity (excluding Direct Business);
(7) whether the proposed transaction will or may cause
the price of the security to increase or decrease, but
following which the price is likely to immediately
return to about its previous level;
(8) whether a proposed bid (offer) is higher (lower)
than the previous bid (offer) but is to be removed from
the market before it is executed;
(9) whether the volume or size of the proposed
transaction is excessive relative to reasonable
expectations of the depth and liquidity of the market
at the time;
(10) whether the proposed buy (sell) order is likely to
trade with the entire best offer (bid) volume and part
of the offer (bid) at the next price level;
(11) whether the proposed buy (sell) order forms part
of a series of orders that successively and
consistently increase (decrease) the price of the
security; and
(12) whether there appears to be a legitimate
commercial reason for the proposed transaction.
Please refer to Practice Note 13.8.1.
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Table 1: Minimum Tick Sizes and Implicit Costs of Transaction Immediacy
Under Bye-Law 2 of the Singapore Exchange, there are five minimum tick sizes for shares traded
at five different price levels. Based on the five price ranges, we compute their corresponding
ranges of relative bid-ask spreads. For example, the minimum tick size is S$0.005 for stock price
below S$1. A trader who buys the stock at the bid price of S$0.005 and sells it at the ask price
of S$0.01 will gain as much as 100%. At the other end of this price range, a trader who buys
the stock at S$1 and sells it at S$0.995 will lose 0.5% on the bid-ask spread. In general, penny
stocks have much larger bid-ask spreads in percent. During our sample period, one U.S. dollar
was about 1.7 to 1.8 Singapore dollars.
Share Minimum Minimum Maximum
Relative Relative
Price Tick Size Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread
Below S$1 S$0.005 0.5% 100%
S$1 to S$2.99 S$0.010 0.333% 1%
S$3 to S$4.98 S$0.020 0.4% 0.667%
S$5 to S$9.95 S$0.050 0.5% 1%
S$10 and above S$0.100 – 1%
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for a Cross Section of 447 Sample Stocks
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample stocks listed on the Singapore
Exchange (SGX). Their dates of listing are at least two months before the sample period from
October 4, 2002 to November 28, 2003. As at end of March, 2003, these stocks constitute well over
95% of the entire market capitalization in Singapore. Using the high-frequency data purchased
from the SGX through a third-party financial data service provider, we compute daily number,
volume and dollar volume of trades that occurred at the bid prices during the sample period for
each stock. Same statistics are gathered for trades that occurred at ask prices. The numbers of
bid and ask updates reflect the quoting activity. The corresponding aggregate depths capture the
prevailing supply and demand of limit-order traders immediately before market orders arrive.
Unit Average Standard Minimum Median Maximum
Deviation
Market Capitalization Million S$ 432.7 1,809 2.2 47.4 23,887
Shares Outstanding Million Shares 511 1,258 9 254 17,827
Price S$ 0.715 1.774 0.005 0.19 17.8
Equity Million S$ 441.9 1,808.3 -947.9 54.4 23,324
Book Million S$ 362.7 1,629.9 -10,765 52.5 25,037
Trades at Bid Number 17.5 32.0 0.2 7.1 384.0
Volume in 1,000 Shares 607.3 1,156.1 0.6 204.8 13,756
Volume in 1,000 S$ 475.1 1,687.9 0.3 52.8 17,769
Trades at Ask Number 18.9 36.4 0.2 7.2 470.6
Volume in 1,000 Shares 646.9 1,261.7 0.6 205.0 14,946
Volume in 1,000 S$ 509.2 1,770.7 0.2 54.4 18,568
Bid Updates Number 40.6 78.0 1.1 15.6 902.9
Ask Updates Number 38.3 72.4 0.8 15.2 811.7
Bid Depth Volume in 1,000 Shares 39,189 228,455 1.5 2,304.4 4,408,143
before a Trade Volume in 1,000 S$ 20,754 103,874 0.8 738.4 1,176,225
Ask Depth Volume in 1,000 Shares 38,054 188,941 1.3 2,298.1 3,289,106
before a Trade Volume in 1,000 S$ 20,311 103,040 0.9 850.0 1,244,505
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Table 3: Subsample of 63 Stocks
This table contains the statistics for 63 stocks that had at least one trade on each of the 290
trading days from October 4, 2002 to November 28, 2003. Their ticker symbols are shown under
the column labeled by SYM. Stocks that are the components of the Straits Times Index are
highlighted in bold font. Dated March 31, 2003, the information source of market capitalization
is the official web site of SGX. The stock prices are the closing prices on the same date. The
number of shares outstanding, earnings per share (EPS) and book value per share (BPS) are
from the third-party data service provider.
SYM Stock Company Name Used by SGX Firm Size Shares Price EPS BPS
Million S$ Millions S$ S$ S$
S12 SingTel S’PORE TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 23,886.6 17,827 1.47 0.0786 0.261
U11 UOB UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD 16,187.5 1,572 10.7 0.6770 5.717
D05 DBS DBS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD 13,518.2 1,555 9.15 0.6538 4.342
O04 OCBC OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORP 12,194.3 1,290 9.55 0.5167 5.445
S55 SIA SINGAPORE AIRLINES LTD 10,658.8 1,218 9.9 0.8741 8.789
S37 SPH SINGAPORE PRESS HOLDINGS LTD 6,520.8 370 17 1.0248 6.082
S63 ST Engg SINGAPORE TECH ENGINEERING LTD 5,134.3 2,884 1.6 0.1147 0.496
H78 HKLand US$ HONGKONG LAND HLDGS LTD 4,452.4 2,295 1.94 -0.3597 2.160
V03 Venture VENTURE CORPORATION LIMITED 3,396.2 240 14.9 0.7536 3.605
K02 KepCorp KEPPEL CORPORATION LTD 3,239.3 770 4.52 0.4654 3.347
C09 CITYDEV CITY DEVELOPMENTS LTD 2,835.6 801 3.54 0.1888 4.821
C31 Capitaland CAPITALAND LIMITED 2,618.0 2,517 1.06 0.1153 2.366
F27 F&N FRASER & NEAVE LIMITED 2,113.1 231 7.95 1.4446 12.148
S59 SIA Engg SIA ENGINEERING CO LTD 1,650.7 1,000 1.61 0.2052 0.838
C27 Chartered CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTOR MFG LTD 1,576.2 3,072 0.765 -0.2444 1.037
W08 Want WantUS$ WANT WANT HOLDINGS LIMITED 1,403.8 1,274 1.1 0.0587 0.335
S51 SembMar SEMBCORP MARINE LTD 1,329.8 1,414 0.925 0.0651 0.663
S68 SGX SINGAPORE EXCHANGE LIMITED 1,250.9 1,003 1.21 0.0160 0.796
S24 ST Assemb ST ASSEMBLY TEST SERVICES LTD 1,151.0 1,154 1.32 -0.1393 0.570
P05 PFood PEOPLE’S FOOD HOLDINGS LIMITED 1,133.3 1,164 0.755 0.1527 0.470
S30 Sp Land SINGAPORE LAND 1,115.2 344 3.38 0.2298 7.044
U14 UOL UNITED OVERSEAS LAND LTD 1,036.7 613 1.73 0.2631 2.769
O07 OUE OVERSEAS UNION ENTERPRISE LTD 1,013.8 176 5.8 0.0190 7.971
U06 UIC UNITED INDUSTRIAL CORP LTD 943.6 1,377 0.745 -0.0975 1.352
C07 C&C CYCLE & CARRIAGE LTD 908.1 242 4.22 0.9565 4.389
A16 Allgreen ALLGREEN PROPERTIES LTD 871.5 1,050 0.79 0.0801 1.505
C76 Creative 50 CREATIVE TECHNOLOGY LTD 858.1 55 11.7 -0.4503 9.676
K17 KepLand KEPPEL LAND LTD 822.0 709 1.19 0.0372 2.089
R03 RafflesH RAFFLES HOLDINGS LIMITED 790.4 2,080 0.365 0.0216 0.895
S53 SMRT SMRT CORPORATION LTD 780.0 1,500 0.54 0.0481 0.409
B16 BIL Intl BIL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 567.7 1,368 0.6 -0.0793 1.120
P27 Parkway PARKWAY HLDGS LTD 550.8 720 0.71 0.0463 0.546
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Table 3, (continued)
SYM Stock Company Name Used by SGX Firm Size Shares Price EPS BPS
Million S$ Millions S$ S$ S$
T05 TAC 200US$ TOTAL ACCESS COMM PUB CO LTD 426.7 474 0.9 0.1014 1.288
D06 DatacrftUS$ DATACRAFT ASIA LTD 418.0 503 0.83 -0.0321 0.333
U01 UniFood UNITED FOOD HOLDINGS LIMITED 411.4 1,112 0.34 0.0838 0.294
C33 ChuanHup CHUAN HUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 408.0 1,088 0.38 0.0448 0.341
600 Hyflux HYFLUX LTD 332.6 236 1.32 0.0393 0.161
G17 Golden Agri GOLDEN AGRI-RESOURCES LTD 314.5 2,169 0.155 0.0192 0.571
C47 ChinaAvOil CHINA AVIATION OIL (S)CORP LTD 293.8 576 0.505 0.0698 0.256
W05 Wing Tai WING TAI HLDGS LTD 287.7 613 0.5 0.0065 1.507
C49 Citiraya CITIRAYA INDUSTRIES LTD 280.5 550 0.49 0.0223 0.089
L15 L-Jacob LINDETEVES-JACOBERG LTD 227.4 288 0.84 0.0806 0.739
J10 Jaya Hldg JAYA HOLDINGS LTD 220.4 735 0.335 0.0447 0.242
A26 AsiaFoodP ASIA FOOD & PROPERTIES LTD 217.7 2,903 0.085 -0.0006 0.781
H34 Hotung US$ HOTUNG INVESTMENT HLDGS LTD 212.9 1,289 0.165 -0.0159 0.176
G01 GES GES INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 203.5 714 0.295 0.0351 0.273
A11 Amtek AMTEK ENGINEERING LTD 169.6 203 0.87 0.1589 1.056
U24 Unisteel UNISTEEL TECHNOLOGY LTD 153.1 239 0.67 0.0698 0.247
E08 EastTech EASTERN ASIA TECHNOLOGY LTD 148.6 302 0.545 0.0672 0.355
E18 ECS ECS HOLDINGS LIMITED 128.1 346 0.375 0.0409 0.310
J09 JurTech JURONG TECH IND CORP LTD 126.0 394 0.385 0.0355 0.182
S03 Seksun SEKSUN CORPORATION LIMITED 112.0 122 0.86 0.1149 0.559
A19 Autron AUTRON CORPORATION LIMITED 110.3 571 0.18 -0.0374 0.023
J13 JK Yaming JK YAMING INT’L HLDGS LTD 108.6 203 0.35 0.0228 0.250
544 CSE Global CSE SYSTEMS & ENGINEERING LTD 103.1 308 0.38 0.0392 0.060
R05 Roly ROLY INTERNATIONAL HLDGS LTD 93.8 390 0.26 0.1064 0.208
N01 NeraTel NERATELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 91.8 360 0.3 0.0590 0.198
F09 FirstEng FIRST ENGINEERING LTD 74.1 200 0.425 0.0743 0.278
I18 IPC IPC CORPORATION LTD 74.0 2,114 0.045 -0.0007 0.065
E23 Europtron EUROPTRONIC GROUP LTD 70.1 281 0.265 0.0242 0.187
D12 Digiland DIGILAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 50.2 715 0.09 -0.0311 0.122
E05 Eastgate EASTGATE TECHNOLOGY LTD 37.5 300 0.13 -0.0112 0.149
596 ThaiVillag THAI VILLAGE HOLDINGS LTD 33.6 146 0.195 0.0236 0.136
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Table 4: Regression Results for a Subsample of 63 Stocks
This table reports the estimated coefficients (Coeff) and the t statistics (t-stat) obtained un-
der two different regression methods. The first is the balanced seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SUR). The second is the pooled OLS regression, for which we show the t statistics with
no correction under the column 0, and with Newey-West correction using different lags from
289 up to 1,445. These numbers are in multiples of individual time-series length of 289.
The dependent variable is the market-and-AR(1)-adjusted daily return. The explanatory vari-
ables investigated are trade imbalance in numbers (TIN), in dollars (TID), quote imbalance
in numbers (QIN), as well as in dollars (QID). Each of these four variables is used sepa-
rately in the regression that includes market breadth (B) as a control. Statistically signif-
icant coefficients based on Newey-West t-statistics at 1,445 lags are indicated in bold font.
For the OLS, we show the adjusted R2 values (R2) and the Durbin-Watson statistics (DW).
SUR OLS
t-statistics with Newey-West Correction
Coeff t-stat Coeff 0 289 578 867 1,156 1,445 R2 DW
Intercept -0.00020 -1.75 -0.00013 -0.79 -0.82 -0.82 -0.82 -0.84 -0.85 2.07% 2.003
B 0.00720 4.42 0.00744 19.59 5.66 5.06 4.79 4.51 4.32
TIN -0.00015 -0.91 -0.00015 -2.65 -1.05 -0.96 -0.93 -0.91 -0.89
Intercept 0.00016 1.32 0.00024 1.47 1.16 1.12 1.1 1.12 1.14 10.6% 2.003
B 0.00192 1.37 0.00146 3.84 1.36 1.23 1.16 1.09 1.05
TID 0.00052 18.45 0.00057 41.63 18.33 17.06 16.08 15.54 15.19
Intercept 0.00013 1.38 0.00007 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.46 2.55% 2.012
B 0.00672 4.27 0.00740 20.01 5.46 4.88 4.57 4.28 4.07
QIN -0.00053 -5.16 -0.00053 -9.79 -5.48 -5.31 -5.48 -5.53 -5.41
Intercept -0.00017 -2.85 -0.00013 -0.77 -0.81 -0.82 -0.81 -0.84 -0.86 3.00% 2.006
B 0.00661 4.02 0.00664 17.91 4.92 4.39 4.09 3.83 3.64
QID -0.00012 -7.76 -0.00015 -13.45 -8.71 -7.86 -7.57 -7.66 -7.97
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Table 5: Regression Results for Five Subsamples of Stocks Sorted by Market Capital-
izations
In this table, we report five sets of multiple regression results. Sample stocks are first sorted
by their market capitalizations as at end of March 2003. The dependent variable is the market-
and-AR(1)-adjusted daily return, ετ . Explanatory variables are the trade imbalance in numbers
(TIN), in dollars (TID), the quote imbalance in numbers (QIN) and in dollars (QID). Every re-
gression has market breadth (B) as a control for co-movement. The specification is
ετ = b0 + b1Bτ
+ b2 sln
(
TINτ
)
+ b3 sln
(
TIDτ
)
+ b4 sln
(
QINτ
)
+ b5 sln
(
QIDτ
)
+ uτ .
The pooled series is indexed by τ . Explanatory variables appear in signed logarithmic levels,
as the function sln(x) is defined as sign(x) ln
(|x|) if |x| > 0 and 0 otherwise. The parameters
b0, b1, . . . , b5 are obtained from OLS procedures. The t-statistics with no correction
(
t-stat (n)
)
and with Newey-West correction
(
t-stat (c)
)
are shown. In addition, p values in percent for the
corrected t-statistics, adjusted R2 values
(
R
2) in percent as well as the Durbin-Watson statistics
(DW stat) for the residuals uτ are also tabulated. Statistically significant coefficients are indi-
cated in bold font. Panel A has 12,686 observations pooled from stocks with the smallest market
capitalizations whereas Panel E has 23,863 observations from stocks with the largest market
capitalizations.
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Coefficient t-stat (n) t-stat (c) p values R2 DW stat
in % in %
Panel A: First quintile (smallest firms), 12,686 observations
Intercept -0.00023 -0.36 -0.35 72.4 6.3 2.010
B 0.01616 11.72 9.54 0.0
TIN 0.00120 2.13 1.53 12.7
TID 0.00140 15.57 13.81 0.0
QIN 0.00273 7.53 4.12 0.0
QID -0.00021 -3.64 -2.13 3.3
Panel B: Second quintile, 16,337 observations
Intercept 0.00076 2.15 1.87 6.1 10.7 2.016
B 0.01000 12.64 7.14 0.0
TIN 0.00265 8.57 5.92 0.0
TID 0.00105 21.54 16.98 0.0
QIN 0.00173 8.49 6.84 0.0
QID -0.00028 -8.54 -7.63 0.0
Panel C: Third quintile, 18,463 observations
Intercept 0.00070 2.53 2.28 2.3 8.4 2.010
B 0.00430 6.83 3.06 0.2
TIN 0.00128 5.90 3.62 0.0
TID 0.00086 24.09 13.23 0.0
QIN 0.00145 9.98 7.34 0.0
QID -0.00025 -10.40 -7.82 0.0
Panel D: Fourth quintile, 21,417 observations
Intercept 0.00049 2.25 1.60 11.0 7.2 2.002
B 0.00146 2.88 0.98 32.8
TIN -0.00022 -1.51 -1.04 29.8
TID 0.00082 31.15 29.40 0.0
QIN 0.00065 6.28 4.32 0.0
QID -0.00013 -7.17 -8.37 0.0
Panel E: Fifth quintile (largest firms), 23,863 observations
Intercept 0.00056 4.50 3.40 0.1 11.4 2.028
B -0.00567 -19.67 -6.73 0.0
TIN -0.00086 -14.33 -5.35 0.0
TID 0.00061 49.61 13.16 0.0
QIN -0.00013 -2.85 -1.43 15.2
QID -0.00010 -10.11 -6.00 0.0
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Table 6: Regression Results for Five Subsamples of Stocks Sorted by Book-to-Market
Ratios
In this table, we report five sets of multiple regression results. Sample stocks are sorted by
their book-to-market ratios. Book values are from the financial data service provider, while
data on market capitalization are from the Singapore Exchange. The dependent variable is the
market-and-AR(1)-adjusted daily return, ε. Explanatory variables are the trade imbalance in
numbers (TIN), in dollars (TID), the quote imbalance in numbers (QIN) and in dollars (QID).
Every regression has market breadth (B) as a control for co-movement. The specification is
ετ = b0 + b1Bτ
+ b2 sln
(
TINτ
)
+ b3 sln
(
TIDτ
)
+ b4 sln
(
QINτ
)
+ b5 sln
(
QIDτ
)
+ uτ .
The pooled series is indexed by τ . Explanatory variables appear in signed logarithmic levels,
as the function sln(x) is defined as sign(x) ln
(|x|) if |x| > 0 and 0 otherwise. The parameters
b0, b1, . . . , b5 are obtained from OLS procedures. The t-statistics with no correction
(
t-stat (n)
)
and with Newey-West correction
(
t-stat(c)
)
are shown. In addition, p values in percent for the
corrected t-statistics, adjusted R2 values
(
R
2) in percent as well as the Durbin-Watson statis-
tics (DW stat) for the residuals uτ are also tabulated. Statistically significant coefficients are
indicated in bold font. Panel A has 21,466 observations pooled from stocks with the highest
book-to-market ratios whereas Panel E has 21,065 observations from stocks with the lowest
book-to-market ratios.
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Coefficient t-stat (n) t-stat (c) p values R2 DW stat
in % in %
Panel A: First quintile (highest B/M firms), 21,466 observations
Intercept 0.00005 0.15 0.15 88.37 4.3 2.008
B 0.00366 4.93 2.15 3.12
TIN -0.00048 -2.62 -1.88 5.99
TID 0.00089 24.99 13.90 0.00
QIN 0.00078 5.72 2.45 1.43
QID -0.00015 -5.90 -5.36 0.00
Panel B: Second quintile, 17,943 observations
Intercept 0.00087 2.73 2.05 4.06
B 0.00655 9.00 3.80 0.01
TIN -0.00001 -0.06 -0.03 97.54 6.1 2.018
TID 0.00094 23.56 16.05 0.00
QIN 0.00100 6.14 3.60 0.03
QID -0.00014 -4.97 -6.09 0.00
Panel C: Third quintile, 16,986 observations
Intercept 0.00039 1.50 1.44 15.02
B 0.00473 7.86 3.89 0.01 7.9 2.019
TIN 0.00002 0.08 0.06 95.42
TID 0.00087 27.13 24.70 0.00
QIN 0.00088 6.68 4.64 0.00
QID -0.00013 -5.61 -5.09 0.00
Panel D: Fourth quintile, 19,222 observations
Intercept 0.00027 1.07 1.01 31.28 6.8 2.010
B 0.00319 5.41 2.01 4.40
TIN -0.00041 -2.55 -1.82 6.84
TID 0.00085 28.98 23.53 0.00
QIN 0.00078 6.67 3.55 0.04
QID -0.00014 -6.47 -5.58 0.00
Panel E: Fifth quintile (lowest B/M firms), 21,065 observations
Intercept 0.00010 0.35 0.35 73.01 4.9 2.008
B 0.00251 3.82 1.71 8.77
TIN -0.00031 -2.00 -1.48 14.00
TID 0.00081 26.53 18.69 0.00
QIN 0.00038 3.25 2.37 1.78
QID -0.00015 -6.72 -6.36 0.00
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Table 7: Regression Results for Five Subsamples of Stocks Sorted by Price Levels
In this table, we report five sets of multiple regression results. Sample stocks’ observations are
sorted by five price levels stipulated in Table 1. The dependent variable is the market-and-AR(1)-
adjusted daily return, ετ . Explanatory variables are the trade imbalance in numbers (TIN), in
dollars (TID), the quote imbalance in numbers (QIN) and in dollars (QID). Every regression has
market breadth (B) as a control for co-movement. The specification is
ετ = b0 + b1Bτ
+ b2 sln
(
TINτ
)
+ b3 sln
(
TIDτ
)
+ b4 sln
(
QINτ
)
+ b5 sln
(
QIDτ
)
+ uτ .
The pooled series is indexed by τ . Explanatory variables appear in signed logarithmic levels,
as the function sln(x) is defined as sign(x) ln
(|x|) if |x| > 0 and 0 otherwise. The parameters
b0, b1, . . . , b5 are obtained from OLS procedures. The t-statistics with no correction
(
t-stat (n)
)
and with Newey-West correction
(
t-stat(c)
)
are shown. In addition, p values in percent for the
corrected t-statistics, adjusted R2 values
(
R
2) in percent as well as the Durbin-Watson statis-
tics (DW stat) for the residuals uτ are also tabulated. Statistically significant coefficients are
indicated in bold font.
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Coefficient t-stat (n) t-stat (c) p values R2 DW stat
in % in %
Panel A: Below S$1, 75,002 observations
Intercept 0.00053 3.30 3.21 0.13 6.7 2.008
B 0.00691 18.65 12.92 0.00
TIN 0.00020 1.74 1.23 21.99
TID 0.00098 48.13 40.61 0.00
QIN 0.00111 13.70 10.35 0.00
QID -0.00017 -11.81 -10.79 0.00
Panel B: From S$1 to S$2.99, 11,999 observations
Intercept 0.00063 3.15 3.09 0.20 9.9 2.025
B -0.00662 -14.52 -11.10 0.00
TIN -0.00083 -8.06 -6.03 0.00
TID 0.00066 31.68 25.87 0.00
QIN -0.00021 -2.54 -2.01 4.48
QID -0.00010 -6.21 -6.05 0.00
Panel C: From S$3 to S$4.98, 1,735 observations
Intercept 0.00032 0.83 0.88 37.64 13.4 2.019
B -0.00830 -9.52 -8.32 0.00
TIN -0.00135 -7.22 -6.20 0.00
TID 0.00047 12.86 12.17 0.00
QIN -0.00017 -1.14 -0.87 38.17
QID -0.00001 -0.27 -0.25 80.20
Panel D: From S$5 to S$9.95, 2,098 observations
Intercept 0.00045 1.25 1.28 20.01 13.2 2.040
B -0.00873 -10.80 -10.09 0.00
TIN -0.00125 -6.61 -6.18 0.00
TID 0.00047 13.70 13.44 0.00
QIN -0.00035 -2.38 -1.87 6.10
QID 0.00003 1.17 1.19 23.57
Panel E: S$10 and above, 1,932 observations
Intercept 0.00003 0.11 0.12 90.58 17.8 2.057
B -0.00231 -3.40 -2.66 0.79
TIN -0.00102 -8.89 -7.46 0.00
TID 0.00033 14.44 11.97 0.00
QIN -0.00041 -4.81 -4.85 0.00
QID -0.00001 -0.49 -0.48 63.21
47
Table 8: Tests Motivated by Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)’s Model
This table reports the OLS statistics for the following regression of market-and-AR(1)-adjusted
daily returns εi ,t:
εi ,t = c0 ,i + c1 ,i sln
(
EXVi ,t
)
+ c2 ,i sln
(
EXVi ,t−1
)
+c3 ,i sln
(
EXVi ,t−2
)
+ c4 ,i sln
(
EXVi ,t−3
)
+ c5 ,i sln
(
EXVi ,t−4
)
+ ei ,t .
The explanatory variable EXV is daily trade imbalance in dollars, TID, in Panel A and quote
imbalance in dollars, QID, in Panel B. The function sln(x) is signed logarithm of |x|. Following
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), up to four lags are specified. The stocks indexed by i are
sorted on their market capitalization as at end of March 2003. The subscript t denotes trading
day. In each quintile, the observations are pooled and OLS with Newey-West correction are em-
ployed to obtain the estimates (Coeff) and t statistics (t-stat). The adjusted R2 values in percent(
R
2) and Durbin-Watson statistics (DW stat) are displayed below each panel. Lag numbers are
indicated in the parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients are shown in bold font.
Panel A: Regression of market-and-AR(1)-adjusted daily returns on TID and four lagged TID’s.
Smallest Firms Second Quintile Third Quintile Fourth Quintile Largest Firms
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 0.00100 2.77 0.00162 6.21 0.00098 3.86 0.00055 3.19 0.00025 3.48
TID (0) 0.00169 21.33 0.00140 22.67 0.00100 17.00 0.00080 23.64 0.00045 9.72
TID (-1) 0.00034 4.03 0.00011 2.44 0.00009 3.50 0.00005 2.29 0.00002 1.89
TID (-2) -0.00022 -2.63 -0.00003 -0.64 -0.00003 -0.74 -0.00004 -1.18 -0.00002 -1.46
TID (-3) -0.00006 -1.08 -0.00002 -0.59 0.00000 0.10 0.00000 0.24 -0.00001 -1.72
TID (-4) -0.00012 -2.24 0.00004 1.49 -0.00005 -1.45 -0.00002 -1.01 -0.00002 -1.24
R
2 in % 5.31 8.46 7.08 7.32 7.79
DW stat 2.008 2.006 2.007 2.007 1.996
Panel B: Regression of market-and-AR(1)-adjusted daily returns on QID and four lagged QID’s.
Smallest Firms Second Quintile Third Quintile Fourth Quintile Largest Firms
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 0.00002 0.08 0.00000 0.04 -0.00006 -0.92 -0.00010 -1.61 0.00003 0.77
QID (0) -0.00005 -0.85 -0.00011 -3.41 -0.00015 -4.40 -0.00014 -6.52 -0.00016 -8.53
QID (-1) 0.00043 3.91 0.00020 4.18 0.00012 3.45 0.00009 3.74 0.00006 7.16
QID (-2) 0.00004 0.76 0.00003 0.75 0.00001 0.41 0.00002 1.24 0.00001 1.46
QID (-3) -0.00002 -0.37 0.00000 0.08 0.00003 1.13 0.00003 1.65 -0.00001 -0.51
QID (-4) -0.00003 -0.63 0.00000 0.06 0.00003 1.53 0.00000 0.29 0.00002 2.45
R
2 in % 0.42 0.24 0.29 0.36 1.24
DW stat 2.012 2.009 2.009 2.003 2.011
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Figure 1: Evidence of Persistent Trading and Quoting Activities. The autocorrelation
functions of trade imbalance in numbers (TIN), in dollars (TID), as well as quote imbalance in
numbers (QIN) and in dollars (QID) are estimated up to 20 lags for the whole sample. The two
lines indicate two standard deviations from zero at the 5% level for the autocorrelation at one
lag.
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Figure 2: Cross-correlation Functions of Trading and Quoting Activities. The cross-
correlation function of trade imbalance in numbers (TIN) on trade imbalance in dollars (TID) is
shown in Panel A for the whole sample. One sees that TIN leads TID by a day with a coefficient
of about 0.08, while it lags TID with a coefficient of approximately 0.05. More substantially, TIN
lags the quote imbalance in numbers (QIN) by a day with a coefficient of about 0.15, as evident
in Panel B. The other four cross-correlation functions are displayed in Panel C to Panel F, where
QID is the quote imbalance in dollars. The two lines indicate two standard deviations from zero
at the 5% level for the contemporaneous cross-correlation.
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Panel E: TID on QID Panel F: QIN on QID
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